\u3cem\u3eCanakaris v. Canakaris\u3c/em\u3e: An Examination of Aspects of Florida\u27s Law on the Dissolution of Marriage by Simonhoff, Rachel
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
9-1-1980
Canakaris v. Canakaris: An Examination of Aspects
of Florida's Law on the Dissolution of Marriage
Rachel Simonhoff
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review
by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rachel Simonhoff, Canakaris v. Canakaris: An Examination of Aspects of Florida's Law on the Dissolution of Marriage, 34 U. Miami L.
Rev. 1227 (1980)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol34/iss5/6
NOTE
Canakaris v. Canakaris: An Examination of
Aspects of Florida's Law on the Dissolution
of Marriage
In this casenote, the author examines the recent decision
of Canakaris v. Canakaris, in which the Supreme Court of
Florida addressed three issues that ordinarily arise in a case of
dissolution of marriage: the proper scope of appellate review,
the award of attorney's fees, and the relation of the special
equities doctrine to lump sum alimony. The author finds the
decision consistent with prior case law, but concludes that
unpredictability may yet surround the equitable distribution of
marital property by lump sum award.
The Supreme Court of Florida, in an attempt to stabilize the
law on the disposition of property and the granting of alimony
upon the dissolution of a marriage, recently established criteria for
use by judges when determining the proper division of marital as-
sets.' In Canakaris v. Canakaris2 the supreme court clarified the
limits of appellate review of alimony awards and the appropriate
basis for awarding attorney's fees in divorce proceedings. Most im-
portantly, the court attempted to harmonize and clarify conflicting
rules of law on the awarding of lump sum alimony.'
In 1963, Elaine Canakaris initiated judicial proceedings
against her husband, John Canakaris, by filing a complaint for sep-
arate maintenance on the grounds of adultery and extreme cru-
elty.4 The circuit court thereupon issued a temporary support or-
der. Both parties complied with this order until a final judgment
for dissolution of their thirty-three-year marriage was entered thir-
teen years later.5
Throughout the marriage, Elaine had abandoned her own edu-
cation and assisted her husband in achieving his goal of becoming
a successful medical doctor. Once John began his own medical
1. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980) (pronounced Can-ak -a-ris).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1199.
5. Id.
6. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 356 So. 2d 858, 861 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (McCord, C.J.,
dissenting).
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practice, Elaine worked in his office as a receptionist, performed a
variety of tasks in his private hospital, and entertained to further
his career. Over the years, John's financial status improved dra-
matically. As of December 31, 1975, his net worth exceeded
$3,700,000,7 and his annual income exceeded $130,000. 8 Elaine's as-
sets on the same date, however, totaled less than $300,000, the ma-
jority of which was her joint holding of hospital realty. Her only
independent income, approximately $1,000 annually, derived from
a $15,000 inheritance. Throughout the entire marriage, John was
virtually her sole source of support.9
During the period of separate maintenance, between 1963 and
1976, Elaine remained in the jointly owned marital home valued at
$75,000. John, on the other hand, acquired another residence on
80 acres of land valued at $430,000.10 The trial court granted a dis-
solution of marriage in December of 1976 and awarded Elaine
lump sum alimony consisting of $50,000 in cash, and John's inter-
est in their jointly owned home. The court also awarded Elaine
$500 per week in permanent periodic alimony, attorney's fees, and
allowed her to keep her undivided half interest in the Bunnell
General Hospital real estate."
The District Court of Appeal, First District, reversed the lump
sum award to Elaine of John's interest in the marital home. Citing
Cann v. Cann," the court asserted that the required special equity
of the wife in the home was not present.13 The court also found the
evidence of the wife's needs insufficient to warrant permanent pe-
riodic alimony of $500 per week, and remanded the case to the
trial court to consider the evidence on the needs of the wife." Fi-
nally, the court concluded that the award of attorney's fees was
improper, because the wife had the ability to pay for her attorney
without assistance.15 On certiorari review, the Supreme Court of
Florida held, reversed: (1) The doctrine of special equity previ-
ously used to justify lump sum alimony awards is a misnomer and
7. Id.
8. 382 So. 2d at 1199.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1199-200.
12. 334 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). "A further element of lump sum alimony is that
it be awarded only where special equities require it or make it advisable." Id. at 328 (cita-
tion omitted).
13. 356 So. 2d at 859-60.
14. Id. at 860.
15. Id. at 861.
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should be used only in analyzing vested property interests; lump
sum awards should be guided by all circumstances relevant to en-
sure equity and justice in the distribution of marital property. (2)
Permanent periodic alimony that is not arbitrary or unreasonable
in light of the circumstances is not an abuse of discretion and
should not be disturbed on review. (3) The inability of a spouse to
pay is not a necessary condition for requiring the other spouse to
pay attorney's fees. A court may properly award attorney's fees to
avoid inequitable diminution of the fiscal sums granted. Canakaris
v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980).
I. APPELLATE REVIEW
Traditionally, trial courts have awarded alimony on the basis
of the needs of the wife, the ability of the husband to pay," and
the standard of living enjoyed by the' wife while married.1 7 Case
law'8 and section 61.08(2) of the Florida Statutes, 9 however, have
expanded these criteria to include the length of marriage, the num-
ber of children, the health of the parties, the wife's contribution to
the marriage and to the husband's career, the conduct of the par-
ties during the marriage, and the avoidance of a dramatic change
in financial status. Given these criteria, and the statutory charge
that the court must consider any factor necessary to do equity and
justice, 0 the question raised is, What standards may the appellate
court apply to review the broad discretion given the trial court to
16. The husband's ability to pay has been determined by his net income and capital
assets. Firestone v. Firestone, 263 So. 2d 223, 226 (Fla. 1972).
17. McAllister v. McAllister, 345 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert. denied, 357 So.
2d 186 (Fla. 1978).
18. See id. at 354 n.2.
19. FLA. STAT. § 61.08(2) (1979) provides:
(2) In determining a proper award of alimony or maintenance, the court
shall consider all relevant economic factors, including but not limited to:
(a) The standard of living established during the marriage.
(b) The duration of the marriage.
(c) The age and the physical and emotional condition of both parties.
(d) The financial resources of each party.
(e) Where applicable, the time necessary for either party to acquire suffi-
cient education or training to enable him or her to find appropriate employment.
(f) The contribution of each party to the marriage, including, but not lim-
ited to, services rendered in homemaking, child care, education and career build-
ing of the other party.
The court may consider any other factor necessary to do equity and justice be-
tween the parties.
20. Id.
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determine and fashion appropriate alimony relief?2
In Bosem v. Bosem,22 the Supreme Court of Florida, without
establishing a definitive standard for appellate review, quashed a
district court decision that the trial judge had abused his discre-
tion by awarding lump sum and substantial periodic alimony. Jus-
tice Adkins, writing for the court, asserted that the trial judge had
wide discretion as the trier of fact to decide what is equitable for
the parties, and had not abused this discretion on the basis of the
evidence.23
In subsequent cases,2 the supreme court again stated that the
award of alimony is within the discretion of the trial court and
could not be disturbed unless there was no supporting evidence, or
discretion was abused. In each of these cases, the supreme court
held that the district courts had exceeded the proper limits of ap-
pellate review by substituting their judgment for that of the trial
court.2 5 Although abuse of discretion had been the firmly estab-
lished standard of review," appellate courts have, on occasion, va-
cated alimony awards when they differed with the trial court on
the propriety of the awards.2 7 In Rosenberg v. Rosenberg,2 8 the
District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that the record did
not support an award of $300 per month for permanent periodic
alimony. In a well-reasoned dissent, adopted by the supreme court
on certiorari review, Judge Hubbart asserted that "[tihe alimony
award herein is well within the realm of reasonable justification
and the only way that it could be reversed is by substituting our
judgment for that of the trial court in re-evaluating and weighing
the testimony and evidence in this cause."'2 9
21. In Canakaris, the supreme court defined judicial discretion as: "The power exer-
cised by courts to determine questions to which no strict rule of law is applicable but which,
from their nature, and the circumstances of the case, are controlled by the personal judg-
ment of the court." 382 So. 2d at 1202 (quoting 1 BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY AND CONCISE
ENCYCLOPEDIA 884 (8th ed. 1914)).
22. 279 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 1973).
23. Id. at 864.
24. Herzog v. Herzog, 346 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1977); Sisson v. Sisson, 336 So. 2d 1129 (Fla.
1976); Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1976).
25. Herzog v. Herzog, 346 So. 2d at 58; Sisson v. Sisson, 336 So. 2d at 1130; Shaw-v.
Shaw, 334 So. 2d at 16.
26. E.g., Hall v. Hall, 363 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d. 459
(Fla. 1979); Burnett v. Burnett, 197 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967); Klaber v. Klaber, 133
So. 2d 98 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961). See FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (1979).
27. Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1976); see, e.g., In re Marriage of Stevens, 327 So.
2d 851 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
28. 352 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), rev'd, 371 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 1979).
29. 352 So. 2d at 869 (Hubbart, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 34:12271230
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The First District decision in Canakaris reflected the reason-
ing of the Rosenberg majority when it stated that the record did
not show that the wife needed $500 per week in permanent peri-
odic alimony.30 On review, the supreme court clarified the discre-
tionary nature of the trial court's decision, emphasizing that no
rule of law was applicable; instead, the trial judge has broad discre-
tion to do equity between the parties. The trial court's decision
could be overturned only if it had abused its discretion." Recog-
nizing the need to establish a test for reviewing the discretionary
power of a trial judge, the supreme court stated that:
Discretion, in this sense, is abused when the judicial action is
arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, which is another way of say-
ing that discretion is abused only where no reasonable man
would take the view adopted by the trial court. If reasonable
men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the
trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its
discretion.82
With this "reasonable man test" the court reemphasized the
discretion vested in the trial court and provided a means by which
the appellate court could better gauge abuse of this discretion. The
test provided in Canakaris requires that the appellate court affirm
an alimony award if reasonable men could differ on its propriety.
Rather than overturning an award because of a vague notion of
abuse of discretion, the appellate court must defer to the trial
court, which hears the facts and fashions its award on broad equi-
table considerations. This "reasonable man test," therefore, adds
needed clarity and emphasis to already established law.
II. ATTORNEY'S FEES
The purpose of awarding attorney's fees in litigation on the
dissolution of marriage is to ensure that both parties will have sim-
ilar ability to secure competent legal counsel.3 To this end, courts
will consider the financial resources of both parties in determining
whether a party is entitled to attorney's fees. 4 The question before
30. 356 So. 2d at 860.
31. 382 So. 2d at 1202-03.
32. Id. at 1203.
33. Cummings v. Cummings, 330 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1976); Mertz v. Mertz, 287 So. 2d 69
(Fla. 2d DCA 1973).
34. See, e.g., Droubie v. Droubie, 374 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Robinson v.
Robinson, 336 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). FLA. STAT. § 61.16 (1979) provides: "The
court may from time to time, after considering the financial resources of both parties, order
19801
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the supreme court in Canakaris was whether a spouse who could
pay for counsel, but only by liquidating resources or using a much
greater percentage of assets than the opposing spouse would have
to use, had a similar ability to secure counsel.
If the requesting spouse is completely unable to pay for coun-
sel or has very limited financial resources, and the other spouse is
in a better financial position and can afford the fees, courts will
generally award attorney's fees. 5 But if both spouses have sub-
stantial assets, as in Canakaris,81 the Florida District Courts of
Appeal have not reasoned uniformly in determining entitlement to
attorney's fees. Some courts have focused primarily on the ability
of the requesting party to pay the fees,8 7 while others have consid-
ered the relative financial positions of both spouses.38
The Second District has focused upon the relative financial re-
sources of the parties in determining whether a spouse is entitled
to attorney's fees." In Jassy v. Jassy,"° the court held that when
the wife had substantial assets, but would have to liquidate these
assets prematurely, the trial court had not abused its discretion by
ordering the husband to pay $2,500 in attorney's fees. The Second
District has also held that it is not an abuse of discretion to require
the husband to pay the wife's attorney's fees when he is able to do
so and such fees would deplete the wife's meager savings.41
The Third District also considers the relative ability of the
parties to pay attorney's fees and will award fees even though the
requesting party has substantial assets. In Pfohl v. Pfohl,42 the
court affirmed the trial court's award of $30,000 in attorney's fees
a party to pay a reasonable amount for attorney's fees.
35. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Mahoney, 380 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Tiffany v. Tif-
fany, 305 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
36. The husband's admitted net worth was $3,749,930, and his annual income ranged
from $130,000 to $147,000 during the five years prior to the dissolution of the marriage. The
wife's annual income during this period was approximately $1,000. Her net worth prior to
dissolution, however, totalled $292,000. 382 So. 2d at 1199.
37. See notes 39-44 and accompanying text infra.
38. See notes 45-48 and accompanying text infra.
39. Droubie v. Droubie, 379 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (disparity in parties' rela-
tive financial position justified award of attorney's fees); Gray v. Gray, 362 So. 2d 294 (Fla.
2d DCA 1978).
40. 347 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). In upholding the award of attorney's fees to the
wife, the court characterized the award as an attempt by the trial judge to equalize the
ability of the wife to secure representation with that of the husband. Id. at 480-82.
41. Suarez v. Suarez, 373 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
42. 345 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). The court granted the husband attorney's fees,
although he had a net worth of $200,000 and was awarded lump sum and rehabilitative
alimony totalling $120,000, when the wife's net worth totalled $4,250,000. Id. at 379.
1232 [Vol. 34:1227
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to the husband, stating that the husband's possession of nonliquid,
non-income-producing assets did not preclude his need for
financial assistance to hire competent counsel. And in Creel v.
Creel,'4 the district court affirmed an award of attorney's fees to a
wife who had substantial assets, because those assets were "not
...readily accessible financial sources for payment of attorneys
fees."44
The First District, on the other hand, has focused more on the
ability of the requesting party to pay attorney's fees than on the
relative financial positions of the parties. In Patterson v. Patter-
son,45 the court declared that the requesting party must prove
financial inability, though not destitution, to be entitled to an
award of attorney's fees.46 The First District has also held, when
both parties had substantial assets, that it is improper to award
attorney's fees to a wife if she is able to pay for counsel.'" And, in
the recent case of Robinson v. Robinson,'O the court again stated
that when the requesting party can pay for legal services, it is im-
proper to require the other party to do so.
43. 378 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
44. Id. at 1252. The court stated that although the wife received substantial assets,
$15,000 lump sum alimony, and the husband's interest in the marital home, her position was
not similar to that of her husband's for the purpose of making attorney's fee payments. Her
assets were not readily accessible; in addition, her husband was continuously earning in-
come, but she had not done so for several years. Id. at 1252-53.
45. 348 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
46. Id. at 596. The First District reversed the award of attorney's fees to the wife be-
cause there was no testimony at trial concerning her inability to pay for counsel. See also
Johnson v. Johnson, 346 So. 2d 591, 593 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (Boyer, C.J., concurring) (re-
questing party must prove financial inability to pay for legal services and ability of the other
party to pay).
47. Butts v. Butts, 362 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (per curiam). The court distin-
guished its previous decision in Valparaiso Bank & Trust Co. v. Sims, 343 So. 2d 967 (Fla.
1st DCA 1977), which charged the wife's attorney's fees to the deceased husband's estate,
despite the wife's financial parity. In Valparaiso, the husband's estimated wealth was
$10,000,000. Before the husband's death, the parties reached an agreement whereby the wife
received a half interest in her husband's assets, which were to remain in trust until ten years
after his death. The court commented that an award of attorney's fees is usually inappropri-
ate when both parties have substantially equal ability to pay for counsel. Here, however,
three unique factors supported the trial court's decision to award fees: (1) it appeared that
the objective of the trust arrangement, which was to divide equally the properties acquired
during the marriage, was not fully attained; (2) it was not clear that the wife had the ability
to pay for counsel because the trust properties were not liquid assets; and (3) attorney's fees
were more readily awarded to divorced wives during the period in which the legal services
were rendered and the judgment entered than when the fee issue finally came before the
court. Id. at 969-71.
48. 366 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
1980]
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In Canakaris,"9 the First District, citing decisions in Patterson
and Johnson v. Johnson5" for the proposition that the party re-
questing a fee award must prove both his or her inability to pay
and the financial ability of the other party to pay, reversed the
trial court's award of attorney's fees to the wife. On review, the
supreme court clarified the issue and held, to the contrary, that
complete inability to pay is not necessary for a spouse to be enti-
tled to an award of attorney's fees. When the husband has greater
resources and the fees would inequitably diminish the wife's assets,
it is proper to require the husband to pay attorney's fees. 1 Thus,
even when both parties have substantial assets, the court must re-
fer to the relative financial position of the parties to determine
whether they have "similar ability" to secure legal counsel.
This decision is consistent with the supreme court's overall
emphasis on achieving equity between the parties.5 2 When award-
ing lump sum and periodic alimony, courts must look beyond a
party's need to other equitable considerations. Likewise, when de-
termining if an award of attorney's fees is proper, even when the
requesting spouse has substantial assets, the courts must look be-
yond the bare need of the requesting party and assess the relative
financial situations of both parties in the context of the property
and support award as a whole. The court will not permit a denial
of attorney's fees to vitiate the objective of an otherwise equitable
distribution of property.
III. LuMP SUM ALIMONY
Lump sum alimony is a payment of a definite sum by one
spouse to the other, which may be paid all at once or in install-
ments over a period of time.53 It may consist of either money or
property5' and, upon final judgment, becomes a vested right.5
In Florida, the circumstances that justify an award of lump
sum alimony have been unclear and contradictory. Much of this
49. 356 So. 2d 858.
50. See notes 45-46 supra.
51. 382 So. 2d at 1204-05.
52. "[Ilt is important that appellate courts avoid establishing inflexible rules that make
the achievement of equity between the parties difficult, if not impossible." Id. at 1200.
53. Morris v. Morris, 272 So. 2d 202, 203 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973).
54. See Halberstadt v. Halberstadt, 72 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 1954); Cann v. Cann, 334 So. 2d
325, 328 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
55. Benson v. Benson, 369 So. 2d 99, 100-01 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). Periodic alimony,
unlike lump sum, is modifiable and is not a vested property right. See Canakaris v.
Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1201-02 (Fla. 1980).
[Vol. 34:1227
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confusion stems from the court's use of the term "special equity"
to refer both to the equities justifying lump sum alimony awards
and to the vested interest that a spouse may acquire in property
accumulated during the course of the marriage.5 6 In the latter us-
age, a spouse may claim a vested interest in property held by the
other spouse at dissolution if he or she has made a contribution of
funds or services, beyond the ordinary marital duties, that materi-
ally contributed to the acquisition of the property.5 7 When used in
this sense, special equity is a vested right, not alimony.58 The su-
preme court introduced the concept of special equities in regard to
lump sum alimony in the case of Yandell v. Yandell.59 The court
stated that a lump sum alimony award was justified if special equi-
ties existed and if the husband could make payment in gross with-
out endangering his economic status. The court did not offer an
exhaustive definition of these special equities, but indicated that
they included situations in which the wife brought property to the
marriage, or contributed to its acquisition. 0 In Calligarich v. Calli-
garich,6' the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, expressed
an often-cited basis 62 for determining the suitability of lump sum
awards. In that case, the court stated that a lump sum award is
justified only when it serves a reasonable purpose, such as rehabili-
tation, or when the length of the marriage or the financial situation
of the parties makes the award advantageous to both. The wife's
need and the husband's ability to pay are determinative."
In 1971, the same year Calligarich was decided, the Florida
Legislature revised the law on dissolution of marriage. Revised sec-
tion 61.08 of the Florida Statutes provides that alimony may be
rehabilitative or permanent, paid periodically or in lump sum, and
56. Meridith v. Meridith, 352 So. 2d 72, 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (Downey, J.,
dissenting).
57. Ball v. Ball, 335 So. 2d 5, 7 (Fla. 1976). When spouses held property in a tenancy by
the entirety during the marriage, the court would divide it equally between them at dissolu-
tion unless one spouse established a special equity. In such a case, the court would award
the property to that spouse, "as if the tenancy were created solely for survivorship purposes
during coverture, in the absence of contradictory evidence that a gift was intended." Id.
58. Eakin v. Eakin, 99 So. 2d 854, 855 (Fla. 1958).
59. 39 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1949).
60. Id. at 556.
61. 256 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971).
62. The District Court of Appeal, First District, has repeatedly referred to the rationale
for lump sum alimony awards expressed in Calligarich. E.g., Baggett v. Baggett, 347 So. 2d
1063 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Cann v. Cann, 334 So. 2d 325, 328 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Jones v.
Jones, 330 So. 2d 536, 538 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
63. 256 So. 2d at 61.
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that any factor necessary to do equity and justice between the par-
ties may be considered. 4 Despite this broad language, the Fourth
District continued to reiterate the Yandell special equity require-
ments for a lump sum alimony award."
The District Court of Appeal, First District, on the other
hand, established a broader basis for lump sum alimony in Brown
v. Brown." Chief Judge Rawls, writing for the court, asserted that
the trial court could use lump sum awards to adjust the material
wealth of the parties at the time of dissolution of the marriage.67
The court noted that alimony payments are based on more than
the support needs of one spouse and the ability of the other to pay;
indeed, "the contributions of each party to the accumulation of
material assets must be considered in dissolving the marital part-
nership."' Chief Judge Rawls concluded that a wife's contribution
to the marital partnership as a homemaker and mother should be
compensated by a lump sum alimony award.69 Thus, under Brown,
64. FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (1979) provides:
61.08 Alimony.-
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court may grant ali-
mony to either party, which alimony may be rehabilitative or permanent in na-
ture. In any award of alimony, the court may order periodic payments or pay-
ments in lump sum or both. The court may consider the adultery of a spouse
and the circumstances thereof in determining whether alimony shall be awarded
to such spouse and the amount of alimony, if any, to be awarded.
(2) In determining a proper award of alimony or maintenance, the court
shall consider all relevant economic factors, including but not limited to:
(a) The standard of living established during the marriage.
(b) The duration of the marriage.
(c) The age and the physical and emotional condition of both parties.
(d) The financial resources of each party.
(e) Where applicable, the time necessary for either party to acquire suffi-
cient education or training to enable him or her to find appropriate employment.
(f) The contribution of each party to the marriage, including, but not lim-
ited to, services rendered in homemaking, child care, education and career build-
ing of the other party.
The court may consider any other factor necessary to do equity and justice be-
tween the parties.
65. White v. White, 314 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). The court awarded the wife, as
lump sum alimony, the marital residence, mortgage payments, and 75 acres of other prop-
erty. Both properties were jointly owned as an estate by the entireties. The Fourth District
modified the judgment, finding that because the wife possessed a separate estate from which
she derived ample income, she had failed to show a need for alimony. The court also stated
that there was no showing that she had a special equity in the property and that neither
party had properly requested the court to partition the property. Id. at 188-89.
66. 300 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974).
67. Id. at 725-26.
68. Id. at 726.
69. Id.
1236 [Vol. 34:1227
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marital property not jointly held may be divided for a lump sum
award based on the wife's nonmonetary contribution to the mar-
riage as a whole, rather than on a showing of special equity and
need alone. The Florida Legislature, in an apparent approval of
the reasoning in Brown70 amended section 61.08 of the Florida
Statutes to include these criteria in determining the proper award
of alimony."
In Goldman v. Goldman,2 Chief Judge Rawls followed the
precedent he set in Brown and declared that the trial court had
abused its discretion by denying the wife lump sum alimony to
compensate her for her contribution to a nineteen-year marriage.
Noting that the husband was "entering his most productive
years '7 3 with assets double those of the wife, Chief Judge Rawls
asserted that the wife, who had devoted her time during the mar-
riage to child-rearing and homemaking rather than to acquiring
material goods, had been short-changed. Subsequent cases in the
First District 74 and the Fourth District75 have explicitly followed
Brown. Other cases, although not citing Brown, have recognized
that special equity is not necessary to justify a grant of lump sum
alimony.7 6
One month before7 7 and one month after78 the decision in
Goldman, other panels of the First District issued decisions that
were inconsistent with Judge Rawls' rationale, harkening back to
Yandell's special equity requirements and Calligarich's require-
ment that the lump sum award be rehabilitative or advantageous
to both parties. Quoting Calligarich, Judge Boyer in Cann v. Cann
stated, "The wife's need and the husband's ability are still the cor-
70. Lee & Altfater, Family Law, 1978 Developments in Florida Law, 33 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1069, 1074 n.29 (1979).
71. 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-339 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 61.08(2) (1979)). The statute is
quoted in full at note 64 supra.
72. 333 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
73. Id. at 121.
74. Ruse v. Ruse, 351 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (per curiam).
75. Johnston v. Johnston, 349 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (per curiam).
76. E.g., Keller v. Keller, 302 So. 2d 795, 796 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974).
77. Jones v. Jones, 330 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). Judge Mills, writing for the
court, asserted that the award to the wife of the husband's interest in the marital home was
unwarranted absent special equities or when the award was not rehabilitative or advanta-
geous to both parties. Id. at 538.
78. Cann v. Cann, 334 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). Judge Boyer, who dissented in
Brown, stated that lump sum alimony is justified when it serves a reasonable purpose such
as rehabilitation or where it is advantageous to both parties and special equities require or
make it advisable. Id. at 328.
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rect equation to follow." '7 9 Subsequent cases have followed this
rationale.80
In 1976, the Supreme Court of Florida addressed the issue of
lump sum alimony in Cummings v. Cummings."1 The court held
that in light of the equal incomes of the parties and the absence of
a positive showing of need by the wife, the husband's pecuniary
ability to pay was not sufficient to justify an award of lump sum
alimony. This reasoning clearly fits the Calligarich line of cases re-
quiring need, but the facts of this case-equal incomes and the ab-
sence of a large disparity in the financial position of the par-
ties-also make the decision compatible with the Brown policy of
equitable division of property.
The supreme court once again addressed the propriety of
lump sum awards in the recent case of Meridith v. Meridith.2
Adopting the dissenting opinion of the Fourth District, the su-
preme court held that there had been no showing of necessity that
would justify awarding the wife the husband's only asset: his undi-
vided one-half interest in the marital home. 83 Once again, the court
focused on the positive duty of the wife to show necessity when the
facts demonstrate that the property is already divided equitably.
The case, which uses the language of need, is not inconsistent with
Brown.
In Canakaris,8 4 the First District confronted a case in which
there was a long-term marriage, a widely disparate financial situa-
tion, and a wife who had contributed to the marriage as a helpmate
and homemaker. Judge Boyer, writing for the court, cited Calli-
garich, Jones, and Cann, and despite distinguishing the special eq-
uities of vested property interests from those involved in lump sum
awards, nevertheless denied Elaine Canakaris the marital home as
lump sum alimony because the record revealed no special equity in
the marital home.8' On certiorari review, the supreme court had a
clear-cut case with which to clarify the special equities doctrine,
79. Id. at 328.
80. E.g., Baggett v. Baggett, 347 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
81. 330 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1976).
82. 366 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1978).
83. 352 So. 2d 72, 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). The husband was a well drilling supervisor
with a net income of $179.35 per week. His only asset was an undivided one-half interest in
the marital home and furniture worth approximately $15,500. The wife received a salary of
$70 per week, the use of a fully maintained and insured automobile, and $2,000 per year in
dividends from a corporation that managed the advertising for her father's automobile deal-
ership. Id. at 72.
84. 356 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
85. Id. at 860.
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and an opportunity to adopt either the Brown or the Calligarich
rationale.8
The supreme court reversed the First District and upheld the
trial judge's award of lump sum alimony, in the form of the marital
home, to Elaine Canakaris.87 The court based the award of lump
sum alimony (1) on distinguishing the special equities doctrine as
it applied to vested property interests and negating its application
to lump sum alimony, and (2) on adopting the Brown rationale,
which defines lump sum alimony as a means for equitable distribu-
tion of marital property, provided that alimony is justified and the
paying spouse has the ability to make a payment in gross.8"
In distinguishing the special equities doctrine, the supreme
court examined the language of the Yandell decision, which speaks
of contribution to the marriage as a whole, not necessarily of a spe-
cific property, and does not mention services that are beyond the
normal marital duties.8 9 Further, the examples listed by the court
are not exhaustive, but merely illustrative of equities that might
justify a lump sum award. The Yandell decision, as the supreme
court asserted, does not require specific special equities, but gives
the trial judge broad discretion to achieve equity and justice for
the parties.90 The trial court, therefore, should not use the term
86. Calligarich views "need" as an essential basis for a lump sum award, while under
Brown, lump sum alimony can be a means for redistribution of marital property to compen-
sate a spouse for contributions to the marital partnership. See notes 55-66 and accompany-
ing text supra.
87. 382 So. 2d at 1204.
88. Id. at 1200-01, 1203-04.
89. 39 So. 2d at 556. See Eakin v. Eakin, 99 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1958). In Yandell the court
stated that:
[A] lump award should be made only in those instances where some special equi-
ties might require it or make it advisable; for instance, where the wife may have
brought to the marriage, or assisted her husband in accumulating, property and
where it is clearly established that the husband has assets sufficient in amount
to pay the gross award.
39 So. 2d at 556. This standard is quite different from the vested interest requirement im-
posed by some courts that the claiming spouse show a contribution of funds or services
beyond normal marital duties, which materially contributed to the acquisition of the
claimed property. 99 So. 2d 854, 855.
90. The supreme court also asserted that Yandel "does not limit the use of lump sum
alimony to instances of support or vested property interests." 382 So. 2d at 1201. Although
this conclusion may follow from the statement in Yandell that the trial court may award
lump sum alimony when it is "equitable and just," 39 So. 2d at 556, it is misleading to say
the court does not limit lump sum awards to support and vested property interests. Al-
though support was and still is a reason for a lump sum award, a vested property interest
has not been, and is not now, a justification for alimony. Eakin v. Eakin, 99 So. 2d 854 (Fla.
1958).
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"special equities" when considering lump sum alimony.9 1 Hence-
forth, in lump sum as in other alimony, courts must consider all
relevant circumstances to ensure equity between the parties 2 and
may make an award in gross if those circumstances justify it.
The elimination of special equities as a basis for lump sum
alimony was a needed clarification of Florida law. Despite the oft-
repeated caveat that one should not confuse special equities in
lump sum alimony with special equities creating a vested property
interest," the identical language had misled courts., The supreme
court's assertion that the special equities required by Yandell for
lump sum alimony referred to the "general equities of the case"9 5
and not special equities of property contribution was both a logical
conclusion and one suggested by the language of the Yandell deci-
sion itself.9' If the special equities were the same for a vested inter-
est and for a lump sum award, the alimony award would be unnec-
essary, since the claiming spouse would already have a vested right
to the property recognized by law.
A question remains, however, whether Canakaris also means
that need is no longer an essential basis for the granting of a lump
sum award. Generally, alimony has been grounded on the wife's
needs and adjusted by other considerations. 7 In Cummings's and
Meridith,9 however, the supreme court required a showing of need
for a lump sum award. Although the Canakaris court does not ex-
plicitly recede from that position, the decision raises some doubt 100
about whether the court intends to eliminate need as an essential
91. 382 So. 2d at 1200-01.
92. See note 64 supra.
93. E.g., Cann v. Cann, 334 So. 2d at 328.
94. E.g., Canakaris v. Canakaris, 356 So. 2d at 860.
95. 382 So. 2d at 1201.
96. The Yandell decision had cautioned that
[tihere may be other situations which might justify or possibly require a lump
sum award, but it should never be made unless the husband is in a financial
position to make payment of such gross award without endangering or actually
impairing his economic status. A lump sum allowance of permanent alimony is
not "fit, equitable and just" unless the husband is in a position to make payment
of the sum so granted over and above the requirements attendant upon the
maintenance of his business or employment, or the preservation of his profes-
sional activities.
39 So. 2d at 556.
97. See notes 16-20 and accompanying text supra.
98. 330 So. 2d 134.
99. 366 So. 2d 425.
100. Costich v. Costich, 383 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). This case, decided after
Canakaris, interprets Canakaris as continuing to require a showing of need as well as justi-
fication and ability to pay.
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element of the lump sum formula.
An examination of the Meridith and Cummings cases in light
of the language of the Canakaris opinion indicates, however, that a
lump sum award may now go beyond need and redistribute prop-
erty to give a spouse equitable compensation for contributions to
the marriage. 10 1 The facts of the Cummings and Meridith cases in-
dicate that the marital property was already equitably distributed,
and, consequently, any award would have had to rest on need. The
absence of need mandated the denial of lump sum alimony.10 2
These cases, therefore, are not inconsistent with the Brown ratio-
nale;103 although discussing them may have added clarity to the
Canakaris opinion, the court had no reason to recede explicitly
from their holdings. The court could drop need as a requirement
for lump sum alimony when spouses have widely disparate
financial resources, without conflicting with these previous deci-
sions. Indeed, the court's assertion that Yandell does not limit
lump sum awards to instances of support'0 4 and the court's reli-
ance on Brown 05 clearly indicate this liberal position abrogating
the requirement of need. Canakaris most likely means that both
special equities and need are no longer essential to lump sum ali-
mony awards.100
A serious question raised by the more liberal reading of
Canakaris is whether the court may properly, in its discretion, re-
distribute marital property when ownership of property located in
Florida is determined by record title10 7 and when no specific stat-
ute calls for equitable distribution of community property.10 8 One
may answer this question affirmatively by reading section
61.08(2)(f) of the Florida Statutes0' as a legislative mandate to ad-
just marital property equitably. The statute provides that in deter-
mining the proper award, the courts shall consider, but not limit
themselves to, the contribution each party makes to the marriage.
Also, the courts may consider any factor necessary to do justice
101. 382 So. 2d at 1200-01.
102. See notes 81-83 and accompanying text supra.
103. See notes 66-71 and accompanying text supra.
104. 382 So. 2d at 1201.
105. Id. at 1204.
106. MacDonald v. MacDonald, 382 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). Decided after
Canakaris, this case asserts that the court clearly tempered the requirement of a positive
showing of necessity.
107. See note 57 supra.
108. See FLA. STAT. § 689.15 (1979).
109. (1979); see note 64 supra.
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between the parties.110 Alimony may be periodic or in lump sum or
both,' and lump sum alimony may be in property."' Therefore, if
a spouse has made a contribution to the marriage, under section
61.08(2)(f) the spouse may be compensated beyond need by a lump
sum award of property. Equitable distribution is apparently not
legislatively mandated in all cases, but it is legislatively permitted
by a lump sum award when the court thinks it justified. The rela-
tively unguided and discretionary nature of this equitable distribu-
tion of property by lump sum award makes this kind of "alimony"
extremely unpredictable at present. Further clarification and defi-
nition will be needed in this area.
RACHEL SIMONHOFF
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Halberstadt v. Halberstadt, 72 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 1954).
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